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Abstract 
Of all patrimonial rights, the right to property is considered by far the most powerful. The 
owner is entitled to the exclusive use of the object, the word ‘use’ is understood in a very 
wide meaning and the owner has a strong position as far as enforcement of his right is 
concerned. He can reclaim the object from anyone (revindicatio), he is usually entitled to 
both positive injunctions (removal of objects from his premises) and prohibitory           
injunctions (in case of trespass). And finally, when the owner has to put up with          
infringements, he is entitled to damages. There seems, however, to be quite a gap     
between the        position of the owner who is entitled to an injunction and that of the 
owner who has to bear infringements and is only entitled to damages. In the first      
situation  (injunction), the owner can vindicate his right according to a property rule 
which allows him to set the price for infringements. In the second case (damages), the 
owner is left to compensatory standards. In this paper, the consequences of the        
substantial shift in protection from an injunction to (different levels of) compensation will 
be illustrated with examples from the modern civil code of The Netherlands. 
Dutch law offers examples of different regimes of protection of the owner: a rather 
strong position (injunctive power) in the area of neighbour law, a relatively strong         
position in case of expropriation (a generous level of compensation), a typical liability 
rule (compensation according to objective standards) when a pressing societal interest     
prohibits injunctive relief, and a weak level of protection in case of a limited restraint of 
the owners capacity in case of a public development plan (only ‘fair’ compensation). 
These examples, which show a sliding scale of levels of protection, raise the question 
whether the right to property is vindicated properly when injunctive power is left for some 
form of compensation in money. They also raise the question according to which      
standards of compensation the right to property can and should be adequately           
protected. 
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1. Property and injunctions 
 
From a historical point of view the right to property seems to be in a comfortable position 
as far as vindication of this right by means of injunctions is concerned. The Roman actio 
negatoria and revindicatio are perhaps the oldest routes to prohibitory injunctions and 
have over the ages developed into a rather strong procedural position for the owner. It 
must be understood, however, that the actio negatoria was, under Roman law, not     
directly based on the right to property as such: it was an action to deny the existence of 
the servitude of someone else than the owner (actio de servitude). The existence of the 
actio negatoria and its later development has, however, contributed to the development 
of the content of the right to property as such.   
While the actio negatoria was only an actio de servitude in Roman law, in      
German law, as well as in other jurisdictions,1 it has developed into a general action on 
behalf of the owner. The action may be used against any kind of infringement other than 
loss of possession (for which the revindicatio was given). The German par. 1004        
Burgerliches Gesetzbuch states: 
 
‘Wird das Eigentum in anderer Weise als durch Entziehung oder Vorenthaltung 
des Besitzes beeintrachtigt, so kann der Eigentumer von dem Storer die 
Beseitigung der Beeintrachtigung verlangen. Sind weitere Beeintrachtigungen zu 
besorgen, so kann der Eigentumer auf Unterlassung klagen.’2 
 
 
The existence of a general prohibitory injunction in case of infringement of property 
rights has, in turn, been the basis for the further development of more general rules on 
injunctions in German procedural law.3  
The development of the injunctive protection of the rights of the owner may have 
been (very) different in other jurisdictions, but the fact that according to English law the 
tort of trespass is one of the few torts that is actionable per se also seems to illustrate 
that the right to property is a recognised source of injunctive power.4 
 A remarkable first insight from this extremely short historical introduction may be 
that the acceptance of a procedural availability of an injunction on behalf of the owner 
has contributed substantially to the development of the right to property as such.       
Precisely stated, the recognition of the procedural position of the owner has not only 
contributed to the recognition of the right (ubi remedium, ubi ius), but it has also fostered 
the content of the right to property. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
1
 See for The Netherlands P.C. van Es, De actio negatoria (Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2005) p. 171 ff. 
2
 When property is injured, by other means than withdrawal or withholding of possession, the 
owner is entitled to require that the intruder end the infringement. If further infringements are to be 
feared, then the owner can require a prohibitory injunction. 
3
 See par. 887, 888 and 890 ZPO. On this development, see the contribution of Willem van Boom in this 
issue. 
4
 On the relatively prominent position of injunctive protection of the right to property under English law, see 
John Murphy, Rethinking Injunctions in Tort Law, 27 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 3 (2007), p. 509-535. 
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2. Property and tort law, a ‘continental’ approach 
 
The relationship between property law and tort law is rather complex from a doctrinal 
point of view and, furthermore, is conceived differently in several jurisdictions. On the 
one hand it can be said that behaviour that gives rise to an actio negatoria can as such 
be seen as unlawful, because it can be viewed as an infringement of a legally protected 
position, and can thus – from a continental perspective – be qualified as ‘tort’.5 On the 
other hand, it must be said that the unlawfulness in these cases is precisely found in the 
existence and scope of protection of the right to property: it is unlawful because it is an 
infringement of the right to property. The added value of the fact that a right to property 
is at stake, is that its content and scope form the source of the concept of unlawfulness. 
In a similar way, a statutory rule may be the source to qualify certain behaviour as 
unlawful. Only in case of breach of uncodified duties – ‘negligence’ not being breach of a 
statutory duty – does tort law itself seem to be the source of unlawfulness.6 It is exactly 
the construction of the right to property, allowing specific procedural powers to the 
owner, which illustrates that its role is independent from the area of tort law. The owner 
may found his action directly on his right to property and need not refer to tort law to    
vindicate his legal position. 
 This does, of course, not mean that there is no role for tort law in case of         
infringement of property rights. The owner may suffer damage from the unlawful       
situation and he can claim compensation for his loss on the basis of tort law. Thus the 
actio negatoria may cumulate with an action out of tort. The actio negatoria serves to 
bring the actual situation into accordance with the law; the action out of tort serves to 
compensate the loss suffered. This distinction is of course most relevant in cases where 
a threat of unlawful behaviour is concerned (and no loss has been suffered yet) and in 
the case of unlawful behaviour of a continuing nature. 
 Furthermore, tort law may provide a criterion with regard to the limits of the    
powers of the owner. On the one hand, for instance, the owner is not allowed to cause     
nuisance when this nuisance can be considered to be of such a nature that it is unlawful. 
Thus, the tort law criterion of ‘unlawfulness’ is the standard to judge the nuisance.7 On 
the other hand, the owner is not entitled to an injunction in case of mere trivial nuisance. 
 This ‘right-based’ approach – the right to property contains powers which justify 
corresponding procedural rights to effect these powers – illustrates that, at least from a 
legal-dogmatic point of view, the right to property is more than the entitlement to       
compensation in money in case of infringement. It contains legal authority apart from the 
right to compensation; for instance the ability to stop an infringement or to prevent a 
threatening infringement. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
 
5
 van Es, De actio negatoria, p. 196. 
6
 On the relationship between unlawful nuisance and infringement of a property right, see A.S. Hartkamp, 
Asser's handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht, Verbintenissenrecht, 4-III. De 
verbintenis uit de wet, (Kluwer, Deventer, 2006) p. 49-52 and F.H.J. Mijnssen, A.A. van Velten & S.E.     
Bartels (et al eds.), Asser's handleiding tot de beoefening van het Nederlands burgerlijk recht, Zakenrecht 
5*, Eigendom en beperkte rechten (Kluwer, Deventer, 2008) p. 55-58. 
7
 Cf. Article 5:37 DCC. 
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3. Injunction or compensation? 
 
The right to property is, however, not unlimited. The authority of the owner to exercise 
his property-right finds its limits in restrictions imposed by written as well as unwritten 
law and in the rights of others. For instance, the second section of the central article on 
property law in the Dutch Civil Code8 states: 
 
‘To the exclusion of everybody else, the owner is free to use the thing provided 
that this use not be in violation of the rights of others and that it respect the     
limitations based upon statutory rules and rules of unwritten law.’ 
 
Statutory rules that may affect the right of the owner are laws regarding neighbours,    
environmental planning regulations, laws on monuments, et cetera. The term unwritten 
law refers to abuse of power9 as well as to tort law.10 The owner’s right finds its limits 
where the use would be unlawful towards another. In practice this means that the      
powerful right of the owner is, for example in the area of neighbour law, often balanced 
against the interests of someone else. The owner’s request for an injunction may thus be 
denied after a balancing of the interests of the petitioning owner and the respondent. 
Here the right to property may ‘end’ in a mere balancing of interests. 
A clear example of this is the case in which an owner has built slightly over the 
border of his premises on his neighbour’s property. To require an injunction with the   
effect that the building be removed, can under specific circumstances be seen as abuse 
of power of the owner. Article 5:54, section 1, DCC then regulates the consequences: 
 
‘Where a part of a building or work has been constructed on, over or under the 
land of another person and where removal of the protruding part would be       
disproportionally more prejudicial to the owner of the building or work than its 
preservation would be to the owner of the land, the owner of the building or work 
may at all times demand that, against compensation, a servitude be granted to 
him in order to preserve the existing situation or that, at the option of the owner of 
the land, the required part of the land be transferred to him.’11 
 
The position of the owner of the premises receives special protection in so far as the  
criterion for abuse of his power is whether the removal would place a disproportionally 
heavy burden on the owner of the building. The fact that violation of a property right is at 
issue, justifies awarding a special weight to the interest of the owner by setting a certain 
threshold.12  
                                               
 
8
 Article 5:1 Dutch Civil Code, hereinafter DCC. 
9
 Article 3:13 DCC. 
10
 Article 6:162 DCC. 
11
 The provision is not applied (Section 3) when the owner of the building can be held to have been in bad 
faith or grossly negligent with respect to the construction. The owner of the protruding part may also be addi-
tionally protected against abuse of power by Article 3:13 DCC, Hoge Raad 15 November 2002, Nederlandse 
Jurisprudentie 2003, 48 (AVO/Petri). 
12
 On the different standards for balancing in case of abuse of power (Article 3:13 DCC) and in case of the 
decision of the court to end a servitude (Article 5:79 DCC) see Valk, ‘De rechter, het Nieuw BW en de voort-
durende verplichtingen op registergoederen’, in: Rechterlijke macht en Nieuw BW, BW-krant Jaarboek 1990 
(Gouda Quint, Arnhem,1990) p. 119-129. See also Hof Arnhem 15 February 2005,  
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Yet, once the request for removal is considered abuse, the infringing party is merely’ 
obliged to compensate the loss according to the regime of damages in case of tort. Thus 
the protection of the owner under Dutch law shifts from a ‘property right-approach’       
(affecting the actual right) to a ‘liability-approach’ (entitlement to compensation of loss).13 
Furthermore, within the liability-approach, the level of compensation of the loss is merely 
based on the market value of the land which is transferred, resulting (at best) in the 
owner being placed in the same financial situation as before the transgression. This 
means that the original owner is in general worse off than the ‘intruding’ party. Misuse of 
this provision is barred by the provision that the rule of transfer is not applied when the 
intruding party can be held to have acted in bad faith or grossly negligent, but the proof 
of this rests upon the owner’s shoulders.14 
 Furthermore, the Dutch Civil Code provides a specific rule for the occasion in 
which the right of the owner is confronted with a societal interest. Article 6:168, section 1 
DCC states: 
 
‘The judge may reject an action to obtain an order prohibiting unlawful conduct 
on the ground that such conduct should be tolerated for reasons of important   
societal interests. The victim retains his right to reparation of damage according 
to this title.’ 
 
This article provides an explicit option to let important societal interests prevail over – in 
theory – any civil right, including the right to property. The phrase ‘important societal   
interests’ is not intended to restrict the application of the article to strictly public interests; 
other important interests may qualify as well. It is, therefore, a potentially powerful      
defence against actions of the owner. The provision has been designed for cases of    
nuisance in particular, but its working is not limited to such cases. So far the Dutch     
Supreme Court has only limited the scope of the article by declaring that restrictions of 
the right to personal freedom, which do not rest upon a statutory basis, do not have to be 
tolerated.15 
As far as the application of Article 6:168 DCC is concerned, the parliamentary 
documents suggest that when the violator is a public authority, its behaviour could be 
judged only in a restrained way, because the public authority should be allowed a margin 
of appreciation for public policy reasons.16 On the other hand, incidentally, in literature a 
more serious test has been advocated: since the starting point should be the prohibition 
of unlawful actions, the article should only be applied if the public interest at stake      
‘evidently’ outweighs the owner’s interest.17  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Nederlandse Jurisprudentie Feitenrechtspraak 2005, 403, applying a special qualified standard for the bal-
ancing of rights in case of Article 5:79 DCC. 
13
 Cf. Calabresi and Melamed, ‘Property rules, liability rules and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’, 
85Harvard Law Review 6, (1971-1972) pp. 1089-1128. On a similar development in Germany, see   Ott and 
Schafer, ‘The dichotomy between property rules and liability rules: experiences from German law’, 1      
Erasmus Law Review 4, pp. 41-58. 
14
 Article 5:54, section 3, DCC. 
15
 Hoge Raad 8 July 1992, NJ 1993, 488. 
16
 
16
  C.J. van Zeben et al (eds.), Parlementaire geschiedenis NBW, boek 5 Zakelijke Rechten, (Kluwer,  
Deventer 1981), p. 59.   
17
 J.M.C.M. Smarius, ‘Artikel 6.3.1.5b Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek dient niet vervangen te worden door een 
mogelijkheid van schadevergoeding bij gerechtvaardigde daad’, WPNR 1984/5698, p. 305-312. 
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This is puzzling. On the one hand it seems evident that a different weight should be 
attached to a public interest (for instance public health) than to the private commercial  
 
interest (the opportunity to make profit) of an owner, because the latter can be             
expressed financially and be met accordingly with monetary compensation. For instance, 
the company that temporarily suffers a loss in turnover as a result of limited access to its 
premises due to necessary construction work on a public sewage system can be        
indemnified properly by an amount of money. On the other hand it does not seem     
possible to determine a specific standard by which to decide whether one interest      
outweighs the other sufficiently significantly to deny an injunction in favour of              
compensation. For example, how much noise should a person living in a quiet residential 
area have to tolerate for the benefit of the exploitation of a highway of national            
importance? 
Once Article 6:168 DCC is applied, the owner’s right is converted into a right to    
compensation for loss. The regime that regulates this under Dutch law appears to be of 
a strictly compensatory nature: the loss suffered is to be compensated according to its 
objective value. 
 
 
4. From injunction to compensation: a sliding scale with a rather steep        
interval 
 
As mentioned above, the right to property, at least in The Netherlands and in Germany, 
primarily provides the owner with a right to injunctive relief of any infringement. Under 
certain circumstances, however, the owner cannot exercise this right and has to settle 
for monetary compensation. These are entirely different things, not only from a doctrinal 
point of view, but from a factual and economic point of view as well. Once it is concluded 
that the owner is entitled to compensation, he has not only ‘lost’ his primary right to an 
injunction, but he has in a substantially different material and procedural position: he will 
have to prove the cause, existence and size of his loss, the remedy is purely compensa-
tory and it is evaluated according to more or less objective standards, as Dutch law does 
not allow for a different set of rules for assessing damage(s) in the case of property    
infringement. And it might turn out even worse: he may not even be entitled to full     
compensation. The level of compensation depends on the type of case. 
The most generous regime of compensation is probably applied in case of       
expropriation by the state. The fact that the owner loses a special right is here thought to 
be adequately compensated by a high standard of compensation. The owner is,         
according to Dutch expropriation law, not only entitled to compensation determined by 
the market value of his property, he is also compensated for the devaluation of the     
remaining property, for the loss of income over a maximum period of 13 years and for 
costs of transfer to a new location. Although this seems a rather generous level of     
compensation, it is not a full compensation, because the compensation for loss of       
income is limited to a certain number of years, whereas for instance in case of personal 
injury such a limitation is unknown. 
 A – presumably, because no cases have been reported – less favourable regime 
is applied after the balancing of interests according to Article 6:168 DCC.  
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It must be assumed that in these cases loss will be calculated as is usual in case of 
damaging an object.18 This means that the objective (market) value is to be reimbursed. 
This value is determined by either the objective costs of reparation, if economically     
sensible, or the cost of replacement (in case of complete loss). It is, however,             
recognised that if reparation is more costly than the objective value of the loss, the 
owner may under certain circumstances claim the cost of reparation. Relevant            
circumstances are the function of the building for the owner (private use, commercial use 
or investment), the possibility of obtaining a similar property elsewhere, and the extent to 
which the cost of repair exceeds the loss of value of the object.19 This shows that there 
may be some, however modest, space for a more subjective approach even if this might 
not be the economically most efficient one. 
 Interestingly, the road of Article 6:168 DCC (no injunction because of societal   
interests, but compensation) has hardly ever been followed as of yet. This may be      
explained by the fact that compensation of public interference with private interest is   
often regulated by law separately. For instance in a case of limited restraint of the      
owners capacity by a public development plan regulating the allowed use of an area for 
the future, a different standard of compensation is applied. In these cases, according to 
the standard of egalité devant les charges publiques, only a ‘fair’ amount of the loss is 
compensated, while a certain amount of the loss is explicitly left with the owner under 
the denominator of ‘normal societal risk’. This implies that in fact the owner may be 
much worse off than in case of full compensation. 
 The shift from injunction to compensation and the different levels of               
compensation in different types of cases reveal a sliding scale of protection towards 
rather modest levels of compensation. On this scale, the shift from injunctive protection 
to compensation of loss appears to be a rather steep interval, as the owner is             
confronted, not only with a loss of his effective power to protect his actual right: a shift 
‘from right to money’, but also with a substantially different procedural position when he 
wants to effectuate his right to compensation. 
 
 
5. Evaluation: proper compensation for the loss of injunctive power? 
 
The above mentioned examples of the shift from protection by way of an injunction 
(actual vindication of the right) to monetary compensation for (sometimes less than) the 
value of the object of the property right, may perhaps in part be explained by the nature 
of the infringement. In cases where public interests are at issue, one could say that from 
the beginning the property right did not contain more than the right of the owner taking 
into consideration possible future restrictions for the benefit of public interests. Under 
Dutch law this line of thinking is reflected in the sentence in Article 5 section 1 DCC that 
the owner has the most extensive right ‘provided that this use not be in violation of the 
rights of others and that it respect the limitations based upon statutory rules and rules of 
unwritten law.’ This illustrates that the owner’s right is not comprehensive but, in view of 
public interests, restricted from the outset.  
 
                                               
 
18
 C.J.J.C. van Nispen, Sancties in het vermogensrecht, (Kluwer, Deventer 2003) p. 24-25, criticizes the 
application of the strictly compensatory measures of the law of damages in case of the application of Article 
6:168 DCC. 
19
 Hoge Raad 1 juli 1993, NJ 1995, 43 (Den Haag/Van Schravendijk). 
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The category of cases in which the owner has to tolerate infringements for the benefit of 
public interests may, therefore, not be entirely representative for the illustration of shifts 
from injunction to (under)compensation.  
However, in all cases in which the nature of vindication of the right of the owner 
shifts from injunction to compensation, the question can be raised whether the standards 
of compensation are adequate. In the search for an adequate standard of compensation, 
the value of the fact that the owner is deprived of his injunctive power should be taken 
into account. The question could be raised what could be seen as the ‘loss’ that results 
from the shift from being entitled to an injunction to being entitled to monetary            
compensation. 
A first relevant point of view should be the shift in procedural position of the 
owner. In case of an injunction the owner can ‘simply’ state that his entitlement allows 
him to defend his right against any type of infringement. It is this aspect that provides 
him with a strong bargaining power in negotiations for a settlement. In case of           
compensation, however, the (former) owner appears to have to deliver an ‘uphill fight’: 
he has to prove infringement, loss, causation and quantum and he usually has to some 
extent to bear the costs of the procedure. In order to make the shift from injunction to 
compensation more gradual, this aspect should be taken into account in the assessment 
of the loss suffered. This provides an argument for a generous standard of                
compensation of costs of the ‘forced transaction’. 
Furthermore, there seem to be ‘intrinsic’ differences between being entitled to 
ownership of something and being entitled to compensation in money. Firstly, the owner 
may be emotionally attached to the object of his property, for instance because it has 
been in his family for decades or even centuries. This aspect is usually not accounted for 
in the assessment of the compensation, although it can be considered to be a real loss 
in fact.20 Secondly, there seems to be an economic difference between entitlement to 
property and entitlement to monetary compensation, because goods and money may 
show a different return. This could be accounted for in the assessment of the             
compensation by considering the price of a similar object with a similar ‘economic 
power’. This, however, may be difficult, because on the one hand it may not be possible 
to acquire such an object in fact (in which case the owner has to put up with the return 
on money instead of the return on his property). It may also be difficult, because the 
standard for a ‘similar’ object may be hard to find, precisely because the original object 
had certain specific economic opportunities. 
An example may illustrate this: a piece of land by a lakeside is expropriated for 
the benefit of a public housing plan. The owner was not able to bargain a price for his 
land on a free market and may be compensated with the price of another piece of land 
nearby a lake. Although this may, from some perspective, put him in a similar position 
(granted that costs of moving, et cetera, are compensated), as he is still living near a 
lake. However, he has not been able to generate the specific economic power of his 
property in the form of the potential benefits from the commercial future of that original 
property: these have been transferred to the new owner. A manner of compensation for 
this loss would perhaps be to provide the original owner with shares in the new project. 
A similar manner would be to take into account in the assessment of the compensation 
the probable benefits the new owner will generate.  
                                               
 
20
 Under Dutch law, compensation of emotional loss in case of damage to goods is only allowed when the 
injurer had the intension to hurt the owner emotionally (Article 6:106, Section 1 under a, DCC). 
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This resembles a form of disgorgement of profits. Although this (disgorgement) is usually 
only considered reasonable in case of some form of intentional infringement, it may be 
questioned why it is not applied more regularly in cases of infringement upon a property 
right, because if the right as such contains a certain economic power, that should be 
taken into account in the compensation. 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The right to property can be considered one of the most powerful rights a person can 
have. This, among other reasons, is because of the ‘injunctive power’ of the right to 
property, providing the owner with a strong factual and economic position in case of a 
(threatening) infringement of his right. When an injunction is not granted, the owner may 
be entitled to damages for having to put up with an infringement, or even for loosing his 
property right (in case of expropriation). For several reasons, however, the entitlement to 
damages may be considered to be only a very second best. The owner is in fact          
deprived of the authority that was incorporated in his property right. He will, at least    
according to Dutch law, be compensated for the value of the object of the property, but 
often even for less than that. And the owner will find himself in a different procedural    
position: he will have to prove the existence and quantum of his loss and he may be   
confronted with the risks of insolvency of the infringing party. These factual and         
economic consequences of the shift from injunctive power to entitlement to               
compensation appear, at least under Dutch law, to be rather large and unfortunate for 
the owner. This raises the question how the implications of a shift from an injunction to 
compensation of loss should be addressed adequately. The very fact that the owner was 
in principle entitled to an injunction in order to protect his position, should therefore, at 
the end of the day, be reflected in an adequate compensation.21 
In order to protect the specific legal power of the right to property, there appear to 
be good reasons to smooth the shift from injunctive power to monetary compensation. In 
this respect several options (or combinations thereof) can be considered. Firstly, a     
specific standard is to be applied in deciding to refuse an injunction. In balancing the    
interests of the owner against other interests a high threshold should be applied. For   
instance, in case of overbuilding onto a neighbour’s property, the decision to deny an 
order to remove the building must be given with great reluctance. Secondly, once an   
injunction is denied, the owner should be met with a generous standard of                
compensation. This can be achieved by compensation, not only of the market value, but 
also of the economic potential surpassing the current market value of the object.        
Disgorgement of (future) profits may be an adequate tool to achieve this. Thus, a        
different law of damages should be applied in these types of cases, allowing a different 
yardstick for measuring the quantum. The very fact that a legal position is initially       
protected with injunctive power should be reflected in the level of compensation once an 
injunction is denied. 
 
                                               
 
21
 This can be seen as a modification of a liability rule, thus becoming a more perfect substitute to the prop-
erty rule. See Ott & Schafer, 1 Erasmus Law Review 4 (2008), p. 54. 
